Bill Frist The Loser? I Don't Think So.
As I write this, it has been less than seventy-two hours since the announcement of a deal among “moderates” in the Senate designed to prevent the exercise of the Constitutional option to end judicial filibusters. And much has already been written about who the biggest winners and losers are as the result of the deal.
But oftentimes, what seems to be true at first may not be an accurate reflection of what actually is. Indeed, given a couple of days to cool off following my initial reactions, I find that what I thought would be the implications for certain Republicans at first may not be the case at all at the end of the day.
To be sure, at this point the agreement carries more positives for the Democrats than the Republicans, and they can legitimately be said to be the winners in the “inter-party” aspect of this little episode. After all, being in the minority, there is nothing they would have been able to do to stop the rules change if they had not been able to reach an agreement with at least six Republicans. Their ability to do this very thing certainly can be recorded as a victory for them, although it is a victory that has the potential to be short-lived.
But the “inter-party” struggle is only one aspect of this episode that merits attention. There is also the “intra-party” struggle that has taken place among the Republicans – specifically, that between the moderates who were a party to this deal and the leadership, most notably Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN).
Early evaluations have chalked this up as a victory for the seven moderates, led by Senator John McCain (R-DC) who, as chief broker of the deal was supposedly able to ace Senator Frist in the early quest to become the party leader in the run-up to the 2008 GOP nomination campaign. The idea being that, by seeming to have taken Mr. Frist’s intended exercise of the Constitutional Option off the table for this congress, Mr. McCain has emasculated the Tennesseean’s leadership, effectively replacing him as the driver of the Senate agenda through 2006.
But there are a couple of things that should give one pause before making such an evaluation. First and foremost is the fact that the willingness of the Democrats to – grudgingly – come to the negotiating table at all is a tribute to Senator Frist, not Senator McCain.
It is the attitude of Washington careerists like Senator McCain (in Washington since 1983 and the Senate since 1987, and showing no signs of wanting to leave anytime soon) – who place “senate tradition” above actually doing the work of the people – that has emboldened the minority party to abuse long-standing – but not constitutionally mandated – Senate procedures to thwart the will of the majority with no fear of consequences.
If there were no threat to end the misuse of filibusters, the minority Democrats would have never agreed to allow votes on any of the nominees in question. For all their bloviating about how they would use the proposed rules changes to their advantage whenever they regained a majority, when push came to shove, their lack of confidence in winning a majority at the ballot box was exposed, their bluff was called, and they were forced to cut some kind of a deal. Rather than embracing the change as an issue to use in a campaign and a tool to use when they were in charge, they did what they had to do to avoid said change. And it wasn’t because of the actions of the Washingtonians in the Senate.
As long as the Senate was under the leadership of the likes of Senator McCain and Trent Lott (R-DC, in Washington since 1973 and the Senate since 1989, and showing no signs of wanting to leave anytime soon), the Constitutional Option, while always present, was never feared by the Democrats because they knew a good Washingtonian like Mr. Lott would never exercise it. And for a weapon to be a deterrent, there actually has to be some reasonable expectation that it might be used.
It wasn’t until a relative outsider like Mr. Frist (R-TN, in Washington and the Senate since 1995 and planning to return to Tennessee in 2007) showed up and clearly demonstrated a willingness to “rock the boat” in order to actually get the people’s work done that we saw the Democrats willing to offer to allow a vote on any one of these nominees, much less three. In other words, Senator McCain would have no deal to crow about, were it not for the resolve demonstrated by Senator Frist and his fellow party leaders like Mitch McConnell and Rick Santorum. Resolve that, from all indications, remains as firm now as ever to break the judicial impasses that remain.
In this deal, the Democrats have been forced to make what are major concessions to their way of thinking. And while seven Republicans have made a major concession of their own, it is important to note that Bill Frist is not one of those seven, and that he has already declared that, the deal not being sanctioned by the Republican leadership, the forcing of a vote on the Constitutional Option remains on the table. So just how is it that he has been emasculated? By the possibility that he might actually lose a vote on the issue? Think again.
When – not if – the Democrats next decide to obstruct one of the President’s judicial nominees, Mr. Frist will be able to demonstrate consistency as he pulls the Option back out for a vote – the untruths that Harry Reid is declaring that the Option is a dead issue notwithstanding. The seven moderates, on the other hand, will be in an awkward position – one that will leave them being open to Democrat criticism for “breaking their word” if they vote for the option, or being on record as voting in opposition to their base if they vote against it. In view of the fact that a majority of the country, including their constituents, voted to allow George Bush to set the direction of the judiciary, this will not be the most pleasant place for them to be.
Senator McCain has said repeatedly that, in cutting this deal, his interest was in the good of the Senate, and not in his presidential aspirations. If only his interest in doing the will and work of the people was as great as his interest in keeping things comfortable for him and his fellow Washingtonians, he might not find himself relying on the dependability of the opposition party to protect his political future.
Bill Frist is the loser? Not by a long shot.
But oftentimes, what seems to be true at first may not be an accurate reflection of what actually is. Indeed, given a couple of days to cool off following my initial reactions, I find that what I thought would be the implications for certain Republicans at first may not be the case at all at the end of the day.
To be sure, at this point the agreement carries more positives for the Democrats than the Republicans, and they can legitimately be said to be the winners in the “inter-party” aspect of this little episode. After all, being in the minority, there is nothing they would have been able to do to stop the rules change if they had not been able to reach an agreement with at least six Republicans. Their ability to do this very thing certainly can be recorded as a victory for them, although it is a victory that has the potential to be short-lived.
But the “inter-party” struggle is only one aspect of this episode that merits attention. There is also the “intra-party” struggle that has taken place among the Republicans – specifically, that between the moderates who were a party to this deal and the leadership, most notably Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN).
Early evaluations have chalked this up as a victory for the seven moderates, led by Senator John McCain (R-DC) who, as chief broker of the deal was supposedly able to ace Senator Frist in the early quest to become the party leader in the run-up to the 2008 GOP nomination campaign. The idea being that, by seeming to have taken Mr. Frist’s intended exercise of the Constitutional Option off the table for this congress, Mr. McCain has emasculated the Tennesseean’s leadership, effectively replacing him as the driver of the Senate agenda through 2006.
But there are a couple of things that should give one pause before making such an evaluation. First and foremost is the fact that the willingness of the Democrats to – grudgingly – come to the negotiating table at all is a tribute to Senator Frist, not Senator McCain.
It is the attitude of Washington careerists like Senator McCain (in Washington since 1983 and the Senate since 1987, and showing no signs of wanting to leave anytime soon) – who place “senate tradition” above actually doing the work of the people – that has emboldened the minority party to abuse long-standing – but not constitutionally mandated – Senate procedures to thwart the will of the majority with no fear of consequences.
If there were no threat to end the misuse of filibusters, the minority Democrats would have never agreed to allow votes on any of the nominees in question. For all their bloviating about how they would use the proposed rules changes to their advantage whenever they regained a majority, when push came to shove, their lack of confidence in winning a majority at the ballot box was exposed, their bluff was called, and they were forced to cut some kind of a deal. Rather than embracing the change as an issue to use in a campaign and a tool to use when they were in charge, they did what they had to do to avoid said change. And it wasn’t because of the actions of the Washingtonians in the Senate.
As long as the Senate was under the leadership of the likes of Senator McCain and Trent Lott (R-DC, in Washington since 1973 and the Senate since 1989, and showing no signs of wanting to leave anytime soon), the Constitutional Option, while always present, was never feared by the Democrats because they knew a good Washingtonian like Mr. Lott would never exercise it. And for a weapon to be a deterrent, there actually has to be some reasonable expectation that it might be used.
It wasn’t until a relative outsider like Mr. Frist (R-TN, in Washington and the Senate since 1995 and planning to return to Tennessee in 2007) showed up and clearly demonstrated a willingness to “rock the boat” in order to actually get the people’s work done that we saw the Democrats willing to offer to allow a vote on any one of these nominees, much less three. In other words, Senator McCain would have no deal to crow about, were it not for the resolve demonstrated by Senator Frist and his fellow party leaders like Mitch McConnell and Rick Santorum. Resolve that, from all indications, remains as firm now as ever to break the judicial impasses that remain.
In this deal, the Democrats have been forced to make what are major concessions to their way of thinking. And while seven Republicans have made a major concession of their own, it is important to note that Bill Frist is not one of those seven, and that he has already declared that, the deal not being sanctioned by the Republican leadership, the forcing of a vote on the Constitutional Option remains on the table. So just how is it that he has been emasculated? By the possibility that he might actually lose a vote on the issue? Think again.
When – not if – the Democrats next decide to obstruct one of the President’s judicial nominees, Mr. Frist will be able to demonstrate consistency as he pulls the Option back out for a vote – the untruths that Harry Reid is declaring that the Option is a dead issue notwithstanding. The seven moderates, on the other hand, will be in an awkward position – one that will leave them being open to Democrat criticism for “breaking their word” if they vote for the option, or being on record as voting in opposition to their base if they vote against it. In view of the fact that a majority of the country, including their constituents, voted to allow George Bush to set the direction of the judiciary, this will not be the most pleasant place for them to be.
Senator McCain has said repeatedly that, in cutting this deal, his interest was in the good of the Senate, and not in his presidential aspirations. If only his interest in doing the will and work of the people was as great as his interest in keeping things comfortable for him and his fellow Washingtonians, he might not find himself relying on the dependability of the opposition party to protect his political future.
Bill Frist is the loser? Not by a long shot.
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